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Margin Transactions and Law
By L. L. Briggs
The general upward trend of the stock market for the past few 
years and the sudden debacle of last October have focused the at­
tention of business men upon the stock exchange and its activities. 
Among these activities, those carried on by the stockbroker are of 
fundamental importance because he bridges the gap between 
buyers and sellers of securities. In performing his duties, it is 
necessary that he handle large amounts of money and stocks for 
customers who deal on a margin basis. This places him in a posi­
tion of considerable responsibility and makes his legal status a 
subject worthy of consideration.
In our present economic system there is need of a method by 
which one can purchase and sell stocks largely on credit. The 
stockbroker undertakes to supply this need by dealing with 
securities on margin for customers. In case of a “long” purchase 
the customer places in the hands of the broker a certain percentage 
of the purchase price, with the understanding that the broker will 
furnish the remainder needed to make the purchase. Since the 
latter is able to supply only a small part of this money, the major 
part of it, usually about eighty per cent, is raised by pledging the 
stock. Then he must carry the stock until the customer orders it 
sold or delivered. If it is sold the broker deducts from the selling 
price the amount of the advances and all charges and turns the 
balance over to the customer. Should the customer decide to 
take the stock, he may do so upon reimbursing the broker for the 
advances and charges. If before sale or delivery the market price 
declines, the broker may call for more margin, so that he will run 
no risk of loss should the price fall more than the original margin. 
If the customer fails to put up the additional margin demanded, 
the broker may sell on the open market, deduct his advances and 
charges from the proceeds and transfer the balance to the cus­
tomer.
The “short” sale differs in some respects from the “long” pur­
chase. In this type of margin transaction, the customer orders the 
broker to sell stock which the customer does not own, and, of course, 
can not deliver, and deposits a cash or a security margin. In order 
that the delivery may be made, the broker, if he has it, may lend 
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the customer the stock sold and keep the money received as secur­
ity. Usually, however, the broker has none of the stock in his 
possession, so he borrows it in order to make the delivery and pays 
the market value thereof to the lending broker. Should the price 
rise the broker may call for more margin and if it is not forth­
coming he may purchase stock in the open market to cover the 
loan, and, after deducting the charges, return the balance of the 
margin to the customer.
The legal effect of the dealings between stockbroker and cus­
tomer is based, in part, upon custom (Richardson v. Shaw (1908) 
209 U. S. 365). According to Chief Justice Rugg in Hall v. 
Paine (1916) 224 Mass. 262:
Doubtless, when one employs another to trade for him in a particular 
market, he impliedly authorizes the dealings to be conducted according to 
the established usages of that particular market, whether he knows them 
or not. . . .
The same principle was later approved by the court in Matter of 
Cates (1922) 283 Fed. 541. However, special agreements be­
tween broker and customer take precedence over trade customs 
and practices in the particular business involved.
First, let us consider the relation of the broker to the customer 
in a margin transaction. Jones, in section 496 of his work on 
Pledges, gives this summary:
The broker acts in a threefold relation: first, in purchasing the stock he is 
an agent; then, in advancing money for the purchase, he becomes a credi­
tor; and, finally, in holding the stock to secure the advances made, he be­
comes a pledgee of it. It does not matter that the actual possession of the 
stock was never in the customer. The form of a delivery of the stock to 
the customer, and a re-delivery by him to the broker, would have consti­
tuted a strict formal pledge. But this delivery and re-delivery would 
leave the parties in precisely the same situation they are in when, waiving 
this formality, the broker retains the certificate as security for the advance.
Dos Passos, on page 196 of his standard book on Stock Brokers, 
says:
Upon the whole, while it must be conceded that there are apparently some 
incongruous features in the relation, there seems to be neither difficulty nor 
hardship in holding that a stockbroker is a pledgee; for, although it is true 
that he may advance all or the greater part of the money embraced in the 
speculation, if he acts honestly, faithfully, and prudently, the entire risk is 
upon the client. ... To introduce a different rule would give opportuni­
ties for sharp practices and frauds, which the law should not invite.
Chief Justice Hunt, in the leading case of Markham v. Jaudon 
(1869) 41 N. Y. 235, said:
It can not be doubted . . . that shares of stock in an incorporated com­
pany, however unsubstantial may be its character, or however fluctuating 
their value, may form the subject of a pledge. . . .
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The above quotations may be considered fair statements of the 
rule followed in New York where margin stock transactions are 
most numerous and important. According to this doctrine, the 
broker, although he usually requires the customer to sign away his 
formal rights to the shares and takes them in his own name, is not 
the owner of stock bought on margin for a customer, but is merely 
a pledgee of that property and the relationship between the par­
ties is that of pledgor and pledgee. The same situation prevails 
where the customer deposits stock with the broker as margin for a 
purchase. In McIntyre v. Whitney (1910) 139 N. Y. 557, the 
court said:
I am unable to perceive how in principle there can be any distinction be­
tween a pledge of shares of stock to a broker as security for advances made 
by him with which to make the purchase and a pledge of stock or other 
property to a bank for an ordinary loan.
The fact that the customer initiates the transaction, pays interest, 
bears the burden of assessments, receives dividends and incurs 
the liability for depreciation, seems clearly to show an intention, 
not to create merely a contract right for future delivery, but to 
vest in him the beneficial ownership of the stock, subject, of course, 
to a security title in the broker. The New York rule has been 
followed by the state from which it receives its name, by the 
supreme court of the United States (Richardson v. Shaw (1908) 
209 U. S. 365), and by the highest courts of California, Connecti­
cut, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
Although it has been held in three decisions that the customer 
remains the owner of securities deposited with a broker as margin, 
thus making the latter a pledgee (Furber v. Dane (1909) 203 Mass. 
108; In re Swift (1901) 108 Fed. 212; Hutchinson v. Le Roy (1902) 
113 Fed. 202) it appears to be settled in Massachusetts that the 
legal title to stock carried on margin or deposited as margin is in 
the broker and not in the customer. According to Justice De 
Courcy in Crehan v. Megargel (1920) 235 Mass. 279:
In accordance with the long established rule of law in the commonwealth, 
the legal title to the stocks carried on margin was in the brokers, as be­
tween them and their customer; and this is true alike of the stocks bought 
on margin by the defendants, and those deposited with them. . . .
Consequently, the relationship between the parties is that of 
debtor and creditor (Chase v. Boston (1902) 180 Mass. 458; 
Furber v. Dane (1910) 204 Mass. 412). The broker is regarded 
as the owner of the shares upon a conditional executory contract 
to deliver them to the customer on demand and proper tender 
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(Western v. Jordan (1897) 168 Mass. 401). The supreme court of 
Massachusetts, speaking through Chief Justice Holmes, regarded 
the “extreme tenuity of connection with any specific object” as an 
insurmountable obstacle to the existence of a pledge (Chase v. 
City of Boston (1902) 180 Mass. 458).
The fact that the Massachusetts doctrine does not give the 
customer legal title to the stock bought for him on margin or 
deposited by him as margin does not mean that he has no rights in 
the shares. He has an equitable right in them that will be pro­
tected by the courts. In Furber v. Dane (1909) 203 Mass. 108, 
the court allowed a plaintiff in equity to recover stock deposited 
on margin with a broker.
The Massachusetts rule has been adversely criticized. Dos 
Passos, in Stock Brokers, states that if this construction were 
adopted it would become very questionable whether all margin 
transactions could not be set aside as mere wagers. It is only by a 
perverted construction of the understanding of the parties that 
the broker can be regarded as the owner of the stock because all 
indicia point to the customer as the holder of the legal title.
The way in which a broker carries on his business prevents him 
from keeping the margin stocks acquired for each customer apart 
from other stocks of the same kind. By common practice, securi­
ties deposited are merged with and treated in precisely the same 
manner as securities purchased (Crehan v. Megargel (1920) 235 
Mass. 279). According to the court in Richardson v. Shaw (1908) 
209 U. S. 365:
. . . stock has no earmark which distinguishes one share from another 
. . . like grain of a uniform quality, one bushel is of the same kind and 
value as another.
While in the hands of the broker, at least, the courts regard shares 
of stock as fungible. Consequently, there is no reason for separa­
tion of shares and the law places the broker under no obligation in 
this respect.
Moreover, the broker need not keep the identical certificates 
purchased or deposited as his right to substitute certificates of a 
like kind and of the same aggregate amount is unquestioned 
(Duel v. Hollins (1916) 241 U. S. 523). This point was settled in 
New York over a century ago when Chancellor Kent, in Nourse v. 
Prime (1820) 4 Johns. Ch. 490, said:
The shares in question were not defined and designated, so as to be dis­
tinguished from other bank shares in the same bank; and if defendants had
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always, in their possession and names, and under their control, shares to 
that amount, during the whole time of credit given by the note, and were 
ready, able and willing, at all times, to account to the plaintiff for that 
number of shares, and the dividends arising thereon, whenever he en­
titled himself to such an account, it is all that he could ask for under the 
contract.
More recently, the supreme court of the United States, in Sexton 
v. Kessler (1912) 225 U. S. 90, when discussing the rights of a 
broker, said that:
.... he may satisfy the earlier customers with any stock that he has on 
hand or that he buys when the time for delivery comes. . . .
At common law, apart from special contract, the pledgee has no 
right to pledge the property of the pledgor. Such an agreement, 
however, the courts generally imply in stockbrokerage cases in 
which the shares are not fully paid for, by virtue of the general 
custom of pledging in the brokerage business (Skiff v. Stoddard 
(1893) 63 Conn. 198). According to the United States supreme 
court in Sexton v. Kessler (1912) 225 U. S. 90:
When a broker agrees to carry stock for a customer ... he may pledge 
the whole block purchased for what sum he likes. . . .
No question of the broker’s right to pledge arises when the cus­
tomer makes an express contract giving him that privilege. In 
brief, the broker has been given, either by custom or by express 
contract, the right to hypothecate at his discretion any or all of 
the securities so held by him for the purpose of providing himself 
with the necessary funds to carry on the business in behalf of his 
margin customers. But if he does not have in his possession a 
like amount of similar securities he must not pledge for an amount 
greater than the customer’s indebtedness (Douglass v. Carpenter 
(1897) 17 N. Y. App. Div. 329). It was decided in Fisher v. 
Mechanics and Metals National Bank, (1915) 89 N. Y. Misc. 587, 
that with the consent of the customer the broker may pledge 
securities deposited with him as margin for a greater amount than 
the indebtedness of the customer. However, the New York 
stock exchange prohibits its members from pledging or lending 
more of the securities covered by a special contract than is fair 
and reasonable in view of the customer’s obligations.
Where a customer’s margin stock has been pledged by a broker 
the lien of the pledgee is superior to the rights of the customer. 
If the broker does not pay the loan such pledgee may sell or other­
wise dispose of the shares without notice to the customer and 
incur no liability to him. The purchase of pledged stock by the 
pledgee at a sale in the regular way conveys a good title to the 
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particular securities as against the customer (In re Stringer (1916) 
230 Fed. 177). The rights of a purchaser in these circumstances are 
based upon the estoppel of the owner of the stock, since his ac­
tions preclude him from disputing as against the pledgee the exis­
tence of the title or the powers of the broker (Matter of Mills (1908) 
125 N. Y. App. Div. 730). If a broker has rightfully pledged a 
customer’s securities together with his own, the broker’s securities 
must be exhausted first to pay the loan.
Although the broker is allowed to mingle the stock purchased 
for and deposited by his margin customers, the laws of every 
jurisdiction require him to keep in his possession or under his 
control sufficient shares of a like kind to be able to make delivery 
at any time to all customers without being obliged to purchase in 
the market (Crehan v. Megargel (1920) 235 Mass. 279). The 
court, in Gormam v. Littlefield (1913) 229 U. S. 19, said:
It was . . . the duty of the broker, if he sold the shares specifically pur­
chased for the appellant, to buy others of like kind and to keep on hand 
subject to the order of the customer certificates sufficient for the legitimate 
demands upon him.
Justice Sheldon, in Greene v. Corey (1912) 210 Mass. 536, main­
tained that:
The broker . . . must show that he has under his control, free from the 
just demands of other customers and available for delivery to the customer 
whose case is in question, the stocks of which that customer upon payment 
will be entitled to demand delivery.
The customer contracts for the right to have the stock actually 
held by the broker and does not intend to rely upon the financial 
ability of the broker to purchase it when the time for delivery 
arrives. If this were not the law a broker would be able to specu­
late at his customer’s expense.
The margin is the amount which the customer transfers to the 
broker at the beginning of the transaction and equals the differ­
ence between the current price of the shares purchased and the 
indebtedness. If there is no special contract between the parties, 
there is an implied agreement by the customer to maintain the 
proportion of margin originally deposited (Markham v. Jaudon 
(1869) 41 N. Y. 235). If this amount falls below the required 
level, the customer is in default, and, after demand and notice, the 
broker is permitted to close out the account in order to protect 
himself from loss. According to the court in Van Dusen-Harring­
ton Co. v. Jungeblut (1899) 75 Minn. 298:
There is a well-established custom that if a stock touches margin, it is to 
be sold for the highest it will bring.
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In Foster v. Murphy and Company (1905) 135 Fed. 47, it was 
maintained that:
A margin is intended for the protection of the broker, but if he be com­
pelled to postpone the sale of the property which he is carrying for the 
customer until he has no margin left, it is difficult to perceive upon what 
theory any adequate protection is afforded.
Even where there has been no failure on the part of the customer 
to maintain his margin, the broker may, in some circumstances, 
close the account. Since no time limit is usually set in a transac­
tion of this kind, it would seem that the broker should not be under 
obligation to keep the account open indefinitely. It has been 
suggested (43 Harvard Law Review 628) that the broker may end 
the relation after the lapse of a reasonable period of time for 
speculation, although the customer has kept ample margin. The 
extreme difficulty of defining “reasonable period of time” would 
render this right of little practical utility to the broker. However, 
if the broker is not under contract to carry an account for a def­
inite time, and desires to close it, he may take the shares to the 
customer and demand payment of the balance due on them. If 
the customer refuses to pay, the broker may sell the stock on due 
notice and close the account.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the broker must 
demand more margin and give notice of the time and place of the 
proposed sale before he may sell the stock of a defaulting customer. 
Usually the amount required must be named, but, in White v. 
Slayback (1919) 179 N. Y. Supp. 211, the court held that if the 
customer knows the amount, the demand probably need not be 
for a specific sum. The general rule is that demand and notice 
must be served upon the customer personally. If the contract 
has been made through an agent, notice to the agent is sufficient 
(Small v. Housman (1913) 208 N. Y. 115). Should the customer 
attempt to avoid the serving of notice, legal requirements are 
satisfied by sending the papers to his place of residence (Leiter v. 
Thomas (1905) 97 N.Y. Supp. 121). Where there is no attempt at 
evasion, the demand and notice must actually reach the customer 
or his agent—reasonable effort on the part of the broker will not 
suffice.
By express contract or provision in the memorandum of pur­
chase, the broker may limit his responsibility for demand and 
notice to the defaulting customer before selling the margin stock 
of the latter. (Godfrey v. Newman, 239 N. Y. Supp. 585 (1930).) 
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If he reserves the right to sell “without demand and notice” he 
may sell and close the account when the price declines enough to 
deplete the margin without communicating to the customer 
(Stibbard v. Owen (1928) 243 Mich. 148). Should he merely re­
serve the right to sell “without notice” he must make a demand 
for additional margin, but there is no obligation on his part to state 
the time and place of sale (Stenton v. Jerome (1873) 54 N. Y. 
480). However, before the broker can take advantage of an ex­
press contract limiting his liability, he must prove it (Thompson 
v. Baily (1917) 220 N. Y. 471). Mere receipt of a memorandum 
is not conclusive evidence of the customer’s acquiescence to the 
provisions in it (Evans v. Hubbard (1927) 221 N. Y. Supp. 642) 
so the broker must produce adequate proof of the customer’s 
assent before he will be permitted to avail himself of any rights 
given him by such memorandum (Stibbard v. Owen (1928) 243 
Mich. 148; Leviten v. Bickley (1929) 35 Fed. (2d) 825).
After demand and notice by the broker, the customer must be 
allowed a reasonable length of time within which to increase his 
margin and this is true although the market is in a state of panic 
{Small v. Housman (1913) 208 N. Y. 115) or the exchange about 
to close {Sanger v. Price (1906) 98 N. Y. Supp. 513). Neither the 
death (Berberich's Estate (1917) 257 Pa. 181) nor the bankruptcy 
of the customer will excuse the broker for refusing this privilege 
(In re Daniels (1875) Fed. Cas. No. 3566). One hour’s notice 
is not ordinarily sufficient (Lazare v. Allen (1897) 20 N. Y. App. 
Div. 616); one day’s notice was held to be enough in Harris v. 
Pryor (1892) 18 N. Y. Supp. 128; while the court in Stewart v. 
Drake (1871) 46 N. Y. 449 decided that notice of two days would 
suffice.
If the customer remains silent after demand and notice on the 
part of his broker, a perplexing situation arises. Does this 
silence indicate an order to sell or does it show that the customer is 
willing to be carried further in the hope that the market will im­
prove? Decisions covering the specific point are lacking, but in 
two cases, in which the notice was defective, the courts held that 
silence of the customer could not be construed as an order to sell 
{Esser v. Linderman (1872) 71 Pa. 76; Lynch v. Simmons (1904) 
87 N. Y. Supp. 420).
Should the broker waive the customer’s default in complying 
with a demand for additional margin, he is not permitted to sell 
the stock until a new demand has been made {Rogers v. Wiley 
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(1892) 14 N. Y. Supp. 622). In Small v. Housman (1913) 208 
N. Y. 115, it was held that a broker who, after making a demand 
for margin, agreed to carry the stock until a definite future date 
without further margin, waived the customer’s default and was 
liable for a sale of the stock because he did not make a second 
demand.
The broker, if he so desires, may increase his obligations by 
special contract. He may agree to purchase and carry stocks on a 
nominal margin (Keller v. Halsey (1911) 202 N. Y. 588) or he may 
agree to carry stock as long as the customer wishes, regardless of 
the state of his margin account and of the market, and to deliver 
on demand (Hall v. Paine (1916) 224 Mass. 62). The courts 
insist that the agreement be clear in order to be enforceable. A 
general statement as “will see you through ” is too indefinite to be 
binding {White v. Slayback (1919) 178 N. Y. Supp. 421) although 
similar statements have been made the basis of an estoppel, where 
the customer has not been given reasonable notice of their with­
drawal {Rosenthal v. Brown (1928) 247 N. Y. 479). The customer 
desiring to take advantage of such agreements must be able to 
prove them.
It is difficult to determine the consideration where the agree­
ment of the broker to increase his obligations is made after the 
original contract has been completed. In a case in which a broker 
later promised to carry the account without further margin, the 
court found that the customer’s forbearance to withdraw the ac­
count was the consideration {Rogers v. Wiley (1892) 131 N. Y. 
527). If the customer has no intention of such action, the prob­
lem of finding consideration is perplexing because the broker re­
ceives no benefit. It is only just, however, that the subsequent 
agreement be enforced on the ground of waiver or on the theory 
that when the original contract was made a later modification was 
planned by both parties.
The broker is under obligation to obey the orders of his margin 
customer. If ordered to buy stock he must make the purchase. 
If he accepts a margin order which could have been executed by 
the exercise of reasonable care he will be responsible for his failure 
to fill it {Markham v. Jaudon (1869) 41 N. Y. 235). The cus­
tomer may disregard a subsequent purchase and claim damages on 
the basis of the original unexecuted order and he is entitled to a 
price at which the order should have been executed, subject to 
any saving made by reason of a late execution. In short, if the 
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broker does not buy as ordered, the customer is entitled to dam­
ages measured by the difference between the price at which the 
stock could have been bought had the order been executed and the 
market price within a reasonable time after the customer had 
notice of the failure to execute.
Where the broker fails to sell margin stock as ordered the cus­
tomer may recover the profit that he would have made if the 
shares had been sold according to instructions. This usually 
means the difference between the amount which could have been 
obtained by the broker at the time he was ordered to sell and the 
amount subsequently obtained, if the latter is less than the former 
(Allen v. McConihe (1891) 124 N. Y. 342).
A statement of a customer to brokers carrying stock on margin 
for him, that he was leaving town and did not want to lose more 
than he had to his credit at that time, was held by the court, in 
Hirsch v. Jacoby (1914) 146 N. Y. Supp. 179, to be an order to 
sell. The brokers, who did not sell until the loss exceeded the 
margin, were not permitted to recover the difference from the 
customer. Furthermore, the facts that a customer’s margin has 
become exhausted and he has refused to furnish more do not 
justify a broker in refusing to sell, on his customer’s orders, and he 
is liable for the damages resulting from such failure to obey (Zim­
merman v. Heil (1895) 86 Hun. 114). However, a failure to re­
ceive an order is a good excuse for not executing it. The burden 
is on the customer to prove that his instructions actually reached 
the broker (Birnbaum v. May (1902) 58 N. Y. App. Div. 76).
The broker must procure delivery of the margin shares to the 
customer on demand and tender of the amount due on the transac­
tion (Chase v. Boston (1902) 180 Mass. 458). If the parties do 
not intend that delivery shall be made, the contract is illegal 
(Rice v. Winslow (1902) 180 Mass. 500) because it is a mere wager 
on the market price of the stock.
Where the broker makes an unauthorized purchase to close out 
a short sale previously made, the courts have uniformly held that 
the customer may repudiate and then completely disregard (Bar­
ber v. Ellingwood, No. 1. (1909) 120 N. Y. Supp. 947). He may, 
at any time after prompt repudiation, require the broker to buy in 
the short stock, and may sue for the difference between the price 
at which the stock could have been bought upon such order and 
the price at which the unauthorized purchase was made (White v. 
Smith (1874) 54 N. Y. 522). No question of reasonable time is 
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involved if the repudiation of the wrongful purchase has been 
prompt.
An unauthorized sale of a customer’s margin stock by a broker 
is conversion, where made without notice of time and place of sale 
(Baker v. Drake (1876) 66 N. Y. 518) unless notice is waived 
(Milliken v. Dehon (1863) 27 N. Y. 364) or waiver is implied from 
proof of reasonable usage known to both parties (Skiff v. Stoddard 
(1893) 63 Conn. 198; Van Duzen-Harrington Co. v. Jungeblut 
(1899) 75 Minn. 298). Upon discovery of the wrongful sale, the 
customer may disaffirm it and call upon the broker to replace or he 
may replace himself and sue the broker for any damage that he 
may suffer.
The early rule in New York was that a plaintiff in an action for 
conversion might recover as damages the greatest value reached 
by the stock converted from the time of conversion down to the 
time of the trial, provided that the action had been brought within 
a reasonable length of time and had been diligently prosecuted 
(Markham v. Jaudon (1869) 41 N. Y. 235). The underlying 
theory seems to have been that the wrongful sale might be disre­
garded and the plaintiff given the benefit of the highest price he 
might have obtained up to the time of the trial (Romaine v. 
Allen (1863) 26 N. Y. 309). It soon became evident that this 
rule was not equitable in the case of speculative transactions in­
volving corporate shares (Mathews v. Coe (1872) 49 N. Y. 57) 
because it presupposed the willingness and ability of the customer 
to carry the stock through all fluctuations and to pick the highest 
price. This usually gave him more than he would have received 
for the stock had there been no conversion and placed a broker 
who had acted in good faith, but erroneously, at a disadvantage. 
The rule, however, was followed in New York until 1873, when 
Justice Rapallo, in Baker v. Drake (1873) 53 N. Y. 211, said:
An amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss, which is 
the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act com- 
plained of, and which a proper degree of prudence on the part of the com­
plainant would not have adverted, is the measure of damages. . . . The 
advance in the market price of the stock from the time of the sale up to a 
reasonable time to replace it, after the plaintiff received notice of the sale, 
would afford a complete indemnity.
The doctrine of Baker v. Drake is also followed by the United 
States supreme court and by the highest courts of Connecticut, 
Illinois, New Jersey and Virginia.
In Pennsylvania, the measure of damages for an unauthorized 
sale is the highest market price of the stock at any time between 
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the conversion and the verdict, with interest (Sproul v. Sloan 
(1913) 241 Pa. St. 284). The highest market price at any time 
between the conversion and the commencement of the action is 
the measure of damages allowed by the courts of California. 
{Woltz v. Hutton, 204 Pac. 248).
The customer whose margin shares have been converted is 
given a reasonable length of time in which to decide what to do, 
and to seek advice and funds if he should desire them. This 
period of time generally begins to run only after he learns of the 
wrongful sale. However, if he has knowledge of facts sufficient 
to put him on inquiry that would have revealed the conversion, 
the reasonable period starts when this knowledge was obtained 
{Mayer v. Monzo (1917) 221 N. Y. 442). In one case the court 
held that a customer was put on inquiry when he learned that his 
broker had gone out of business {O'Connor v. Gilmore (1919) 
N. Y. App. Div. 3rd Dept. N. Y. L. J. 1439).
Where a broker has wrongfully closed a customer’s margin ac­
count, and, after learning what has happened, the customer re­
mains silent, such silence is considered to be a ratification of the 
broker’s action. In a recent case (Leviten v. Bickley (1929) 35 
Fed. (2d) 825) in which a broker, without the permission of his 
customer, had closed the account of the latter, it was held that the 
acceptance of the balance and a silence of nine weeks was tanta­
mount to ratification and barred recovery in action against the 
broker. However, if the customer is not aware of all the facts, the 
courts will not construe his silence as ratification {Burnham v. 
Lawson (1907) 103 N. Y. Supp. 482). The purpose of the rule, 
that silence in these circumstances is ratification, is to prevent the 
customer, by his delay, from taking advantage of a fluctuating 
market at the expense of his broker (Leviten v. Bickley (1929) 35 
Fed. (2d) 825).
A broker who fails to keep control of enough stock to satisfy 
the demands of his margin customers is also guilty of conversion. 
According to the court in Whitlock v. Seaboard National Bank 
(1899) 29 N. Y. Misc. 84:
. . . the broker is guilty of conversion if he cannot return the stock origi­
nally pledged or similar certificates, upon payment by the original debtor of 
the amount owing on his stock transaction.
Losses resulting from the broker’s failure to maintain the 
amount of any particular kind of stock should be apportioned 
among the margin customers entitled to that kind of stock. This 
110
Margin Transactions and Law
is the same as saying that the shares in control of the broker 
should be divided among the margin customers claiming the par­
ticular kinds. Suppose that a broker, who holds on margin six 
hundred shares of stock A for Doe and four hundred shares of the 
same stock for Roe, is able to produce only five hundred shares of 
this stock. Since the law is that customers claiming the stock 
must share it pro rata, Doe is entitled to three-fifths of the total, or 
three hundred shares, while Roe will receive two-fifths, or two 
hundred shares. The courts have decided it to be unjust to ap­
portion a loss resulting from a shortage of one kind of stock among 
all the margin customers of a broker because there is no common 
interest in the particular kinds of stock held. However, where 
the broker pledges stock held on margin for more than the amount 
owed on such stock by customers, the resulting loss must be 
borne by all the margin customers in proportion to their respec­
tive claims (In re McIntire (1910) 181 Fed. 955).
When a stockbroker becomes bankrupt there is no controversy 
if he controls enough shares to meet the demands of all margin 
customers. If the available stock is inadequate for this purpose, 
there usually appear two distinct conflicts: one, between margin 
customers and general creditors and the other among the margin 
customers themselves. The general creditors insist that the mar­
gin customers hold the same claims on property of the bankrupt as 
they themselves have, that is, they are merely creditors with no 
property rights, and the indebtedness such customers may prove 
is the amount of their credit balances on the date of the bank­
ruptcy. The margin customers answer by maintaining that they 
have employed the broker as their common agent to buy and sell 
stocks, and, that in executing their commissions he obtained 
stocks which he holds for them; therefore, these stocks may not 
be counted as part of the general assets. Moreover, the margin 
customers may have considerable trouble in settling their own 
differences. One writer says:
. . . they seek all sorts of priorities and superior equities as against one 
another and to that end grasp at every device and circumstance to identify 
and to follow particular securities as belonging to themselves.
The Massachusetts law favors the general creditors in that it 
recognizes the contractual claims of margin customers to the ex­
clusion of all property rights, except, possibly, in the case of 
securities deposited as margin. The general creditors are sup­
ported in their claim that the customers are merely creditors like 
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themselves with provable claims. The federal courts in bank­
ruptcy cases controlled by the Massachusetts statutes have con­
formed with the apparent doctrine in that jurisdiction (In re 
Swift (1900) 105 Fed. 493; In re Gay & Sturgis (1918) 251 Fed. 
420) which is in keeping with their policy of following the local 
law (In re Codman (1923) 287 Fed. 806). However, since in the 
other important jurisdictions the customers have the legal title to 
the margin stock, the courts in these states have held that they 
have property rights in it in addition to their contractual rights 
arising from the agency relationship, so the margin shares are kept 
apart from the general assets of the bankrupt broker (In re Solo­
mon (1920) 268 Fed. 108).
If there is a deficiency of particular shares, the margin cus­
tomers have no rights against the general assets to force the 
trustee to purchase stock to make up the shortage. Although 
the broker was at all times bound to do this, the obligation does 
not pass to the trustee because its proper discharge requires the 
skill and judgment which the bankrupt himself was employed to 
exercise. The customer usually has a choice in these circum­
stances. He may rely upon his property rights and, in that case, 
he and other claimants to similar stock will share it pro rata 
{Duel v. Hollins (1916) 241 U. S. 523); or he may waive his prop­
erty rights and prove his claim as a general creditor. If some of 
the margin customers, who have property rights in the shares of 
a certain security, do not assert these rights, the weight of au­
thority is that the proportionate interests of the other customers 
in the shares are not increased, but that the shares of those who 
may claim, but fail to do so, go to the general creditors {In re 
Archer (1923) 289 Fed. 267).
If the bankrupt broker is guilty of excessive pledging of margin 
shares, the trustee should pay the excess out of the general assets 
to the extent necessary to redeem the stocks in which customers 
seek to enforce their property rights. Since the trustee takes the 
property subject to all valid claims, this is merely the performance 
of a fiduciary obligation and is not a preference {Richardson v. 
Shaw (1908) 209 U. S. 365). He must not permit the pledged 
stocks to be taken to pay the debts of the bankrupt broker. He is 
under obligation to deliver upon demand and tender of payment, 
and it would be impossible for him to fulfill that obligation if he 
did not redeem the pledged stock. However, the trustee, any 
more than the bankrupt, is not required to procure the release of 
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stocks pledged for more than the amount which the customer 
owes on them, if the customer does not pay or tender the amount 
of his debt.
Where the broker has failed to purchase the stock for which a 
customer has put up a margin, but has the money, ear-marked, in 
his possession on the date of bankruptcy, the customer and not the 
trustee is entitled to it (In re Wettengel (1916) 238 Fed. 798). If 
the broker mingles the customer’s margin with his own funds, the 
law presumes that any money withdrawn belongs to the broker 
while the remaining funds are the property of the customer (In 
re Mulligan (1902) 116 Fed. 715).
The courts indicate by their decisions that they appreciate the 
advantageous position of the stockbroker in margin transactions. 
The evident trend is to give the customer as much protection as 
possible without encroaching upon the rights of the broker or 
hindering him in the performance of what is an important eco­
nomic service. The signs of the time point to more numerous, 
larger, and more widely distributed stock issues, and the attitude 
of our jurists is favorable to such corporate expansion.
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